


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13 November 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT:** Conversation with Mr. Rocha and Mr. Lasa  
After Their Meeting with Mr. Helms**PERSONS PRESENT:** Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose Lasa,  
Nenior D. Sanchez (alias Nicholas o7  
Silva)**TIME AND PLACE:** 1700 hours, 13 November 1962,  
Dupont Plaza Hotel, Washington, D.C.

1. Rocha and Lasa were very pleased and happy over their discussions with Mr. Helms. Unless U.S. policy becomes one of coexistence with Castro, Rocha is certain the Agency and the DRE can continue mutually beneficial cooperation.

2. The purpose of this conversation was to define the more specific points of disagreement as viewed by Rocha. Before starting Rocha admitted that many of the past disagreements were minor but had become "the Berlins" of the DRE mainly because of the manner in which they were presented by their Miami contact. In short they refused to be dictated to and threatened. Rocha gave his

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
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contact in Miami a copy of the 'Ugly American'. He agreed this wasn't conducive to good relations but added he was so fed-up by this time that the DRE felt it was impossible to discuss anything of importance with their contact anyway.

3. According to Rocha the following items in order of importance have caused the most difficulty:

a. Military operations: The DRE feels it has been completely checked in this field, obviously the field in which they feel and want to be operating. They feel their plans are not considered seriously and alternate plans have not been presented to them. They would like to know if the DRE is going to be considered for participation in military operations (sabotage, etc) or permitted to conduct their own? Rocha claims 85% of the DRE membership in exile are presently inactive, they also have approximately 30 men who have been trained by the Agency. In short a desire to use the DRE manpower for operations against the Castro regime. As requested by Mr. Helms, Rocha agreed to present their plans for Agency consideration.

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
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b. International Operations, Latin American Operations:

(1) Administrative; The DRE has 15 men ready including visas to send to countries in Latin America. They need the money and authorization to send them.

(2) They are presenting a plan to have two "traveling secretaries" who could travel and check the activities of the different delegations. They also feel there is a need at present for a meeting or reunion of the chiefs of their delegations in order to formulate new plans and targets. Rocha feels the old themes of discrediting Castro, betrayal of Revolution, etc., have lost their steam and new propaganda themes must be developed.

(Rocha is personally interested and admitted that even if and when the Cuban problem is resolved the DRE wants to continue its operations in Latin American. I introduced the subject of continued future long range cooperation. Rocha and Lasa both agreed this would be very desirable provided knowledge of this cooperation could and would be limited to the top leadership of the DRE, fearing they would be rendered completely ineffective if




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stamped as a stage of Yankee imperialism in Latin America. I agreed this would not be desirable for either party. They claim this is what has happened to their delegate in Lima and the reason for pulling him out. They admit he has done a tremendous job but expanded so fast and is doing so much he has been labeled a CIA agent. Rocha admits the failure of the Lima Rep is that he did too good of a job, ironic as this may sound. Rocha claims Peruvians have asked him why the DRE has a CIA agent as Rep in Lima.)

(3) This discussion brought up the subject of salaries for DREEL/A Reps and who would pay them. Rocha admitted this subject and Lie detector tests have become the "Berlins of the DRE". He agreed they were minor compared to the importance of the overall relationship. I suggested it was inconceivable to me that some arrangement acceptable to both parties couldn't be reached on such minor details (emphasizing minor to soften his "no compromise" Berlin position.) I used the line that


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our Reps in Latin America were held responsible for the coordination of all Agency activity in their particular countries whether their own or one in which their help was asked by another element of the Agency. It was the Agency Representatives in the LA countries who felt it necessary to have the responsibility to pay the salaries of their contacts if they were held responsible for activity they were asked to become involved with. I suggested I felt it was a small concession to make for the benefits we (DRE included) were deriving from this cooperation. Rocha agreed, but it was evident he was still dragging his feet so I brought up the subject of the DRE general fund and how if the DRE did not pay the salaries they would hold back the percentages "voluntarily" from each man's salary. I suggested that probably an arrangement could be reached with their new Miami contact that the salary could be split, permitting Agency Reps, to pay the DRE Reps in LA the salaries agreed to, and giving DRE Hqs in Miami the percentage they would hold back if they themselves were paying the salaries. Both Rocha and Lana admitted they personally felt

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


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this was a reasonable approach and admitted they would agree to such a solution, but desired to discuss it with their people in Miami. (presumably Manuel Salvat). I made it clear that the above was only a personal idea as how I felt an agreement could be reached. Lasa talking to Rocha commented that he was certain an agreement could be reached and he personally agreed to such a solution. (Lasa pushed Rocha into stating he also agreed).

(4) Regarding the use of the Lie detector I told Rocha I was not interested in how the subject had broached with them but felt if they were at all seriously interested in the security of their organization, I found it hard to believe how they could afford not to take advantage of this aid to keep themselves from being penetrated. The Agency is certainly concerned over the possibility that a group with which ~~they are~~ cooperating could be penetrated and he, Rocha, as the group leader should be even more concerned, especially when he is responsible for the lives of individuals in hostile




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territory. Rocha stated this concerned him very much and did agree to test the R/O's and individuals infiltrated. But, I asked Rocha did he honestly feel this was sufficient? I continued that he knew as well as I that the communists were capable of penetrating at rather high levels, as proven by known cases which have been uncovered. Furthermore, I continued, as a responsible leader he should find it difficult to ask his men to undertake something he would not do himself, after all this is a basic principal of good leadership. This approach visibly rocked Rocha especially with Lasa nodding profusely in agreement (This fellow Lasa must be kept around as a prop). Rocha then related the story of how even the Jesuits have been penetrated. Again, I asked Rocha to consider the Lie detector tests on the basis of an aid for their own protection.

(5) Finances: Rocha expressed hope that we would not continue the present system of requesting funds by written memorandum for each expenditures. He complained this involved much paper work, and many times because of the delay in receiving approval, sometimes 3-4 days, operational opportunities would be missed. I admitted I was not aware of the



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financial system being used but if they were experiencing difficulties I encouraged them to accept Mr. Helms' offer and set up a system with the help of an Agency expert.

They were concerned over not having received the operational expenses for November and wondered when they could expect them. I promised to check.

*[Signature]*  
NESTOR E. SANCHEZ  
TYW/PA-PROP

